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There is a "male standard" in law, Florence Kelley proclaimed through
the early 1920's. Kelley, the executive secretary of the National Consum-
ers' League, believed existing legal rules and rhetoric represented only
men's interests. If women were subject to these male rules, she reasoned,
this equal treatment would yield unequal results. Kelley wanted equality
for women, but she was firmly committed to an equality based on
women's differences from men, rather than an equality grounded on gen-
der neutrality. She tried to introduce to American law a female standard,
one that created new legal rhetoric, concentrating on women's distinct ex-
periences. This equality-through-difference approach was summed up by
the phrase "industrial equality," which women who agreed with Kelley
used to explain their approach to law and social change.'
Historians have dubbed these women "social feminists." 2 They were
the women who staffed the many reform organizations that grew between
the late nineteenth century and the New Deal. Many had political roots
in the settlement houses, where they began to create child- and woman-
centered reforms that built the foundation for the welfare state. Among
their important reforms was protective labor legislation for women. These
laws limited the hours women could work, provided a variety of on-the-
job health and safety measures for women, and attempted to put a legal
floor on the wages a woman could earn.'
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Historians tend to cast the social feminists as rather static in their ap-
proach to reform, depicting them as women who valued general social
reform over feminism and who unquestioningly accepted women's depen-
dency on men.4 Although it is true that social feminists did not challenge
women's dependency until 1920, a longer view of social feminism,
presented in this article, reveals that it underwent important changes in
the 1920's. In the 1920's, social feminist claims to industrial equality, or
legal equality-through-difference for working women, demonstrated a
growing egalitarian spirit and a feminist approach to law and women's
lives. This feminism was an alternative to the equal rights model, or
equality-through-sameness, commonly associated with the National Wo-
man's Party and the standard history of American feminism. The alterna-
tive of equality-through-difference is best exemplified by the social femi-
nist campaign for a women's minimum wage based simultaneously on
women's value as workers and as domestic caretakers.
The new vision of industrial equality presented some significant
problems for social feminists, however. They were committed to legal
remedies for women's social and economic ills. To carry out this strategy
they needed lawyers, and they joined with some of the leading liberal at-
torneys of their day. Louis Brandeis, for example, agreed to argue Muller
v. Oregon5 for the Consumers' League in 1908, and continued to argue
women's labor law cases for the League until his Supreme Court appoint-
ment in 1916. Felix Frankfurter took Brandeis' place as legal counsel for
the League, and became responsible for litigation in Adkins v. Children's
Hospital,' the women's minimum wage test case. He and other lawyers
close to social feminist groups, such as the Consumers' League, did not
share the industrial equality vision. Rather, the lawyers whom social fem-
inists needed to take their case for equality-through-difference to court
expressed views about women and equality that were in sharp contrast
with social feminism.
Social feminists were saddled with lawyers who basically believed in
women's inferiority, and who read proposals for highlighting women's dif-
ferences as formulae for inequality. These lawyers were generally liberal
in their politics, but they were also the emissaries of the received tradition
in law, and they transmitted values and ideologies deeply embedded in
dominant interpretations of the Constitution. By separating female social
feminists from the male lawyerly company they kept, this article shows
important differences along gender lines in a group historians have for-
merly treated as harmonious.7
4. See, e.g., W. O'NEILL, supra note 2; J.S. LEMONS, supra note 2.
5. 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (women's hours limitation).
6. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
7. For examples of that view of the reform movement, see generally J. WEINSTEIN, THE CORPO-
RATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE: 1900-1918 (1968); R. LUBOVE, THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL
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Important changes in social feminism can be viewed through the win-
dow of two major Supreme Court cases. Muller v. Oregon, the women's
hours limitation case of 1908, is the quintessential example of the social
feminists' early acceptance of dependency. Muller won hours limitation
for women on the basis of women's relative physical weakness and other
claimed biological differences as well as their lack of suffrage rights. So-
cial feminism was transformed, however, by 1923, and these changes were
evident in the less successful Adkins v. Children's Hospital. This post-
suffrage case denied women the right to a minimum wage because they
had purportedly won "equality" with men when the Nineteenth Amend-
ment was ratified. Taking their cue from the suffrage victory, social femi-
nists argued that women were entitled to a state-imposed floor on their
wages because of economic differences-because they earned less than
men. Furthermore, they argued that women's differences from men de-
manded legal attention, especially the social differences of childrearing
and domestic caretaking. During the 1920's, the social feminist stress on
social and economic differences, and an accompanying refusal to discuss
biological differences, marked an important change in the movement. En-
couraged by legal victories, social feminists were pushing beyond their
own prior limitations.
It was litigation strategy, however, that eventually limited social femi-
nism. Forced to put their ideal of industrial equality into legal discourse,
social feminists faced a legal ideology strictly at odds with their perspec-
tive. The cruel irony of working with lawyers who did not share their
views on women cut deeply into social feminist attempts to enact indus-
trial equality. Failure to prevail in Adkins, moreover, curtailed the social
feminists' sense of legal possibilities, much to the detriment of their move-
ment. Equality-through-difference, or industrial equality, was not an idea
whose time had arrived. Instead legal discourse shaped and reshaped this
idea until it was no longer recognizable. At the same time, the litigation
process reshaped the social feminist movement until adherents finally gave
up on industrial equality.
This article brings to light the social feminist political vision of the
1920's, equality-through-difference, which they called "industrial equal-
ity." It argues that industrial equality shaped advocacy of protective labor
legislation during the twenties, separating litigation in that decade from
SECURITY: 1900-1935 (1986); G. KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM (1963). Studies of
men's reform efforts tend to link their activities to preservation of capitalism. These studies, however,
do not address the role of women in reform and the different manner in which social feminists ad-
dressed reform issues for women and children. Unraveling women's approaches to the state may re-
veal a social feminism less committed to capitalism and more devoted to a gender specific politics of
law. Furthermore, studies of gender are bringing to new light alternatives to the social control thesis
of American reform. See Gordon, What Does Welfare Regulate?, 55 Soc. RES. 609 (1988), for an
important critique of the social control thesis and a response to F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, REGULAT-
ING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE (1971).
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the earlier period. This article further shows how those changes put social
feminists at variance with the liberal male lawyers who took their labor
law cases to court. This was a particularly important issue with Felix
Frankfurter, who argued the women's minimum wage test case before the
U.S. Supreme Court. In that case, Adkins v. Children's Hospital, social
feminist Molly Dewson wrote a brief which attempted to articulate indus-
trial equality within the confines of existing legal rules and concepts. Un-
derstanding the Adkins brief in the context of industrial equality promotes
a new explanation of social feminism and the law in the 1920's. Thus,
this article concludes that social feminists were hampered by a friendly
lawyer who did not understand the feminist dimensions of the case, and a
hostile Court which insisted on a vision of equality based on sameness. As
a result, the social feminist case for industrial equality was severely lim-
ited by legal institutions and legal discourse of the 1920's.
II. FROM DEPENDENCY TO INDUSTRIAL EQUALITY: Muller AND
Adkins
In 1920, suffrage, that apparent panacea, had been won, and it left
social feminists with a new sense of power and legitimacy. They were
confident a new age of feminine values was dawning, and women would
now humanize the cruel environment they had long wanted to reform.
Most significantly, these social feminists were imbued with a feeling of
success, which encouraged them to push ahead in wider social reforms.
Industrial justice for women through labor laws held a prominent place
on that agenda. In 1920 there was no issue more important in completing
the labor law campaign than the women's minimum wage.
The issue of minimum wages for women in the 1920's is part of a
larger history of "protective" labor laws. Today these laws are often asso-
ciated with restrictions on women's employment which now constitute
sex-discrimination. It is, therefore, sometimes difficult to understand early
twentieth-century perspectives on these laws. Social feminists who sup-
ported these laws in the twenties called them "women's labor laws," con-
sciously rejecting the idiom "protective labor laws," which they had used
in the previous decade. There is significance to this shift in rhetoric. Social
feminists no longer thought of themselves as "paternalistically" (maternal-
istically?) taking care of other women; instead, they saw this as positive
action for women. However, social feminists' intent notwithstanding, sep-
arate women's labor laws, as constructed in the early twentieth century,
did result in restriction and contributed to women's secondary and inferior
position in the labor force.'
8. Boris, Looking at Women's Historians Looking At "Difference," 3 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 213,
223 (1987), explains that whatever social feminist intent may have been, it could not override "con-
straints of the larger culture," and it reinforced a sex-segregated workplace.
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Although the women's minimum wage was a social feminist issue, as
were other women's labor issues of the early twentieth century, it was
distinct from other women's labor laws. In the Progressive period and
during the New Deal, arguments for women's labor laws stressed "sacred
motherhood" and the need to protect women from harm for the sake of
the future generation. This rhetoric was frequently tinged with racism
and eugenics, justifying laws for women to "preserve the race," and it was
prevalent in the 1908 defense of the ten-hour day for women in Muller.'
During the twenties, social feminists dropped this rhetoric, and began to
make very different arguments concerning women's need for a legal floor
on their wages.
Social feminists had long known that curtailment of women's hours,
secured in Muller v. Oregon in 1908, was meaningless without wage leg-
islation. Hours limitation laws left women actually earning less than prior
to this so-called reform, for working fewer hours meant less overall pay. A
legal floor on wages was intended to bring working women up to a "living
wage." In this spirit, women's minimum wage laws had been passed in
eleven states, one federal district and one U.S. territory. By 1920 em-
ployers had begun serious legal challenges to these laws. The problem of
litigation was not new, and the social feminist community mobilized in its
now familiar fashion for the minimum wage test case, Adkins v. Chil-
dren's Hospital.
But the Adkins case and the minimum wage issue itself would be
treated differently from any previous women's labor laws. This was due
to changes in social feminist ideology, which presented an alternative to
the male standard for personhood in law, and to the direct economic na-
ture of wage laws, which were seen in the twenties as a threat to the
capitalist status-quo.
After suffrage, feminists split into two groups: those who agitated for an
Equal Rights Amendment, and those who favored women's labor laws.
Those who wanted "protection" for women, the social feminists, were
turning their attention to economic equality, through living wages, which
they emphasized over and above formal legal equality. They, too, were
interested in women's equality, but they eschewed the ERA method and
For interpretations of women's labor laws as restrictive, see generally J. BAER, THE CHAINS OF
PROTECTION (1978); Erickson, Historical Background of "Protective" Labor Legislation: Muller v.
Oregon, in 2 WOMEN AND THE LAW 155 (D.K. Weisberg ed. 1982); A. KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO
WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES (1982). Historians have
treated hours restrictions and night work elimination, as well as legislating women out of certain jobs,
more thoroughly than they have minimum wage laws. Most scholars have assumed our understanding
of wage laws should come from what we know about the other protective laws. But wage laws were
different and they deserve attention separate from seemingly related issues.
9. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Boris, Regulating Industrial Homework: The Tri-
umph of "Sacred Motherhood," 71 J. AM. HIST. 745, 750, 754, 756 (1985).
10. Laws had been passed in Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Kansas, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, North Dakota, Oregon, Utah, Washington, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico.
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looked to women's labor laws as a means to substantive equality. Al-
though we must see their proposals for economic equality as limited (or
taking place within certain historical limitations), it is important to re-
member that these social feminists directly confronted the accepted eco-
nomic order, and that they did so over gender issues. In the process they
grappled with a notion of equality for women that relied on both women's
similarity to and difference from men, an ideology they summarized in the
phrase "industrial equality."11
Social feminists placed their hopes for economic equality on minimum
wage laws for women. Prior to taking up the minimum wage/living wage
issue, social feminists advocated women's labor laws on the basis of a par-
ticular image of womanhood: the image of woman presented in Muller,
for example, was weak, frail and dependent. She needed and looked to
men for survival. Far from an economic being, she was a nurturant crea-
ture who needed to be protected in motherhood. In the 1920's, however,
social feminists were no longer interested in arguing for women's wage
laws along these lines. They did not present an image of frail women who
needed higher wages because they were starving faster than men, or be-
cause women's weak constitutions suffered abuse more readily than men's.
Rather, they presented the need for higher wages in light of a woman's
value as a worker and her essential economic contribution to her fam-
ily-a contribution that meant survival of all family members.
Social feminists of the twenties were moving away from an older style
of reasoning that had lent support for Muller. Social feminism was chang-
ing; some women favored women's minimum wage laws because they be-
lieved these laws fostered female independence and self-sufficiency. They
began to stress women's vital economic role in the family. Women were
no longer viewed as necessarily and appropriately the dependents of men.
Instead, social feminists drew public attention to the fact that many
women had dependents under their care. A woman's responsibility to her
dependents was more than nurture-it was economic.
Married women were of particular concern to social feminists. They
believed, realistically, that most women married and bore children. In
1923 the question was not whether women ought to be spared debilitating
11. Previous historians have argued that the twenties inaugurated the "nadir" of American femi-
nism. For this interpretation, see especially W. CHAFE, THE AMERICAN WOMAN: HER CHANGING
SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ROLES, 1920-1970 (1972). Recently Nancy Cott has argued this
era was formative to modern feminism, seeing this as a crucial time on several levels. The most
important for purposes here is the confrontation between differing definitions of equality. She also
provides one of the more sympathetic views of social feminists who supported women's labor laws,
especially because feminists who supported women's labor laws were concerned with social class as
something that made women different from each other. N. Corr, THE GROUNDING OF MODERN
FEMINISM (1987). Previous historians have called these women "social feminists" because they inter-
preted them as placing social issues above women's issues. See W. O'NEILL, supra note 2; J.S. LEM-
ONS, supra note 2. My reading of the social feminists suggests they did put "women first" as they said
themselves, especially in their attempt to merge legal means of change with feminism.
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physical labor, or whether they needed to be protected by men-or by the
state, as they had been in 1908. Instead, the problem for most women,
social feminists declared, was that they faced two jobs: one in industry and
one at home. Social feminists advocated women's labor laws as a means of
easing this double burden.
As social feminists were recasting their ideas about work in terms of
industrial equality, they were also redefining the perceived role of mother-
hood. Where motherhood had previously been portrayed as "sacred"
enough that the state ought to protect it from women's labor, social femi-
nists now considered the difficulties of the double burden in a new light.
They denounced tendencies to compel dissatisfied mothers "to exact more"
from themselves to find fulfillment in mothering. And household labor
was seen as unjust, because it forced women to hold two jobs. As much as
social feminists might have romanticized industrial labor, they were decid-
edly unromantic about motherhood. Motherhood was not empowering,
and when combined with a job outside the home, it was overburdening. In
the absence of maternity leave for workers, children had been born "in the
factories, on the floor in the dressing room, if there was one. ' ' 12 It was
ironic to labor organizer Melinda Scott that in the face of this reality,
another theory had been foisted on women-the glorification of mother-
hood. Critical of such theories about women, Scott declared, "Sacred
motherhood. What a farce.""3 Social feminists believed women's labor
laws would help eliminate some of the work compounded by
domesticity. 1
4
Easing the double burden was not a matter of protecting unborn off-
spring, as it had been in Muller; it became a concern for the health and
social participation of women themselves. That participation was wider
than the domestic sphere, which social feminists had once defined as the
appropriate social space for women; women's participation stretched after
suffrage to include the polity.
While Muller had relied on the characterization of women as mothers,
it also rested on women's disenfranchised political status. As nonvoters,
women seemingly did not have the same contract rights as men. The ide-
ology of free contract, dominant in the nineteenth century, limited legal
interference in the "bargain" between employer and employee unless
12. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 33, PROCEEDINGS OF THE WOMEN'S
INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE 110-20 (1923) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS] (speech of Melinda Scott, La-
bor Legislation for Women).
13. Id.
14. Historians have argued that the purpose of these social feminists may have been to drive
women from industry, but it seems clear in the twenties they advocated working as something that
was good for women; in fact, low wages were seen to be more harmful than work itself. It was the
problem of work and mothering that feminists tried to solve, and women's labor laws seemed the best
solution to them. See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS, supra note 12, at 34-41, 110-20 (speech of Margaret
Dreier Robins, What Industry Means to Women Workers; speech of Melinda Scott, Labor Legisla-
tion for Women).
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there was danger to health, safety or welfare of the community. This po-
lice power exception to the rule lent itself more readily to women workers
than to men in 1900 because women literally bore the future community
and did not possess the same contract rights as men." Women, as
nonvoters, had a different relationship to the state than men had, and
therefore the state's involvement in women's contractual lives was legally
feasible. After suffrage, other legal arguments had to be advanced. Ideas
put forth in the women's wage case took their cue from an altered
women's movement.' 6
Women's labor laws, in the spirit of 1920's industrial equality, raised
new questions about female difference. When Muller was argued, women
were primarily depicted as mothers, but also as people with inferior polit-
ical status. After suffrage, social feminists argued that women were op-
pressed by the double burden, different because they had less money, and
physiologically distinct only in childbearing. Moreover, women were now
"full citizens" and they had the same republican rights as men. But
women needed special provisions to exercise those rights."
It was this fullness of citizenship, the exercise of republican rights, that
women had gained with suffrage. The full meaning of those rights for
working women was possible only through industrial equality. "As
women .. .and as voters" it was appropriate to "agitate" for women's
labor laws, because women had the right to "differ" from men.' That
right often revolved around maternity. Since "men [were] ineligible" for
maternity welfare, as Florence Kelley was fond of pointing out, it made
sense to legislate only for women. Maternity may have been the only
physiological difference relevant to these matters, but some social "adjust-
ment" to maternity was necessary if women were to have "equal fullness
of citizenship with men."' 9
It seemed to social feminists in the 1920's that the best way to make
15. On women and contract rights, see Stanley, Conjugal Bonds and Wage Labor: Rights of
Contract in the Age of Emancipation, 75 J. AM. HIST. 471 (1988).
16. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), for the legal argument that denied nonvoting
women full contract rights. "Free contract," of course, meant the opportunity to bargain for one's own
conditions of labor, however remote victory may have been for the worker. It is here that the experi-
ence of men and women diverged: men bargained for their hours of labor; women's were set by the
state. The crucial difference, legally, was suffrage. Women, however, continued to be in a relatively
weak bargaining position because they were less frequently organized into unions. This situation
remained fairly stable after suffrage as well. Men, ironically, had won their own state regulated
hours, despite the fact that they held the right to vote. Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917); The
Case for the Shorter Work Day, Brief for Defendant in Error, Bunting v. Oregon.
17. NAT'L CONSUMERS' LEAGUE, THE CASE FOR SPECIAL LEGISLATION FOR WOMEN WORKERS
(n.d.) (hereinafter NCL, SPECIAL LEGISLATION] (in Women's Bureau Records, Record Group 86,
Correspondence 1919-1948, Office of the Director, Women's Organizations, at National Archives,
Washington, D.C.).
18. Id.
19. J. HICKS, SPECIAL LEGISLATION FOR WOMEN IN INDUSTRY (1927) (pamphlet of the Com-
mittee on the Legal Status of Women, National League of Women Voters, Box 260, in Papers of the
National Woman's Party, at Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.); Kelley,
supra note 1.
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those social adjustments was through legal attention to difference.
Women's labor laws were one means of providing that attention; they
were the practical expression of the ideology of industrial equality.
III. INDUSTRIAL EQUALITY: SOCIAL FEMINISM IN THE 1920's
Social feminists who supported women's minimum wage laws did so
because they wanted to correct women's inferior status and lower wages.
It was this kind of attention to difference, one that sought separate laws
for women to bring them up to "industrial equality," that was attentive to
women's double burden, women's devalued labor, and hindrances to
women's political participation. These women were eager to extend equal
rights beyond suffrage, but they stressed that positive action was needed to
get closer to actual equality, since women were held back by their distinct
social role. They believed that the necessary action was best addressed
through legal channels. After all, it was through law that they had won
the right to vote and had gained previous protective labor laws.
The National Consumers' League, the National Women's Trade Union
League, the League of Women Voters and the Women's Bureau were the
primary social feminist organizations in the 1920's, and the women who
staffed them believed strongly in equality for women. Even though they
campaigned against the Equal Rights Amendment, they had a profound
belief in the ability of law to provide equal rights for women in society.
Advocating the women's minimum wage as part of this political cam-
paign, they attempted to correct social and economic inequity through leg-
islation and litigation that focused on bringing women's labor standards
up to a new level.
This practice of invoking different treatment to achieve similar results
was the keystone of industrial equality. The League of Women Voters
announced its belief that "equality of opportunity does not and cannot
mean identity of opportunity. 20 If women, as unequals, were treated the
same as men, then women would not fare as well. Women's lower wages,
their relative lack of skill and the fewer opportunities open to them re-
quired some kind of -positive action. Women's labor laws were one such
action; they might "raise the position of women in industry to one more
nearly approaching equality with that possessed by their male fellow
workers." Far from "discrimination," women's minimum wage laws
would inch women toward "equal industrial footing" with men. 2 1
Removing women's "economic disabilities" was not easily accom-
plished, and social feminists did not always believe legislation alone could
20. Definition of Position of National Woman's Party and National League of Women Voters on
Special Legislation (n.d.) (Series 2, Box 98, in League of Women Voters Collection, at Manuscripts
Division, Library of Congress).
21. J. HICKS, supra note 19.
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do the job. Women's labor laws were once part of a proposed constellation
of solutions, including education, technical training and union organiza-
tion.2 But male unionists shunned the prospect of women in their un-
ions-or even separate unions for women; the law, conversely, seemed po-
tentially open to upholding legislation for women on the grounds that they
were different from men. Women's labor laws appeared attainable, and
despite the fact that social feminists had to spend years securing them,
gaining the laws provided social feminists with political legitimacy.2"
Women from the League of Women Voters acknowledged that legislation
was "remedial," addressing "results of economic disabilities," not attack-
ing the cause, but also insisted that "as long as these causes remain, so
will special legislation be necessary."2 4 One of the most important causes,
social feminists were aware, was "persistence of the traditional attitude
toward women's work and education." '2 5
A legally mandated increase in wages might begin to correct traditional
attitudes which suggested that women's labor was worth less than men's.
Positive action to compensate for women's economic inequality was de-
pendent on advocacy by women, for women. Dr. Anna Howard Shaw,
head of the Women's Division of the Council of National Defense, eagerly
declared that "[t]he time has come when it is neither the right of men, nor
the duty of men, nor justice for men to decide problems of work for
women." 26 Mary Anderson, directer of The Women's Bureau, was so
struck by these words that she had them printed on a card she carried
around with her.27 Indeed, locating women's labor laws within the prov-
ince of the women's reform community seemed the best way to keep the
ideology of industrial equality safe. But there were limits to this safety,
and Anderson recognized the dangers: "[t]he men always felt they were
inferior if they did not get higher wages than women," Anderson recalled,
and one employer told her if his male and female workers were "paid...
22. Johnson, WOMAN CITIZEN, Aug. 9, 1924, at 17.
23. Despite pronouncements about unions, most of the groups focused on legislation. It had the
benefit of concrete success, and it offered social feminists access to the political and legal institutions,
and formal institutions in turn offered legitimacy for social feminism when they won. Even the
Women's Trade Union League, which had always prioritized unionization, reluctantly admitted legis-
lation and litigation was a better course in the 1920's, because it seemed more attainable. A significant
aspect of NWTUL in this period was that it was under the leadership of working-class women. This
undoubtedly contributed to increased insistence on the value of women's labor. On the Women's
Trade Union League, see N. DYE, As EQUALS AND As SISTERS: FEMINISM, THE LABOR MOVE-
MENT, AND THE WOMEN'S TRADE UNION LEAGUE OF NEW YORK (1980); E. PAYNE, REFORM,
LABOR, AND FEMINISM: MARGARET DREIER ROBINS AND THE WOMEN'S TRADE UNION LEAGUE
(1988).
24. Johnson, supra note 22.
25. Id.
26. Shaw, Remarks before War Labor Board, quoted in M. ANDERSON & M. WINSLOW, WO-
MAN AT WORK: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MARY ANDERSON AS TOLD TO MARY WINSLOW 107
(1951).
27. M. ANDERSON & M. WINSLOW, supra note 26, at 107.
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the same there would be a revolution. There is a tacit understanding" that
women would be paid less."
Wage laws, too, had their limitations. Despite the fact that social femi-
nists insisted on female self-sufficiency and the role of women as support-
ers of families, the standard "living wage" was based on the needs of a
single woman living away from home, with no one to support but her-
self. 9 Although social feminists made it known that women often sup-
ported others, the wages set by minimum wage laws did not begin to ad-
dress the economic troubles besetting women with dependents. Social
feminists of the twenties took an important step in recognizing the social
and economic roles of women, but their wage scheme suggested they be-
lieved women with dependents should have acquired a partner to share in
breadwinning. This position assumed the benefit of reinforcing traditional
family values. Yet, simultaneously, it advanced the value of women, and
encouraged independence for at least some (single) women.
On the other hand, social feminists sometimes pushed beyond their own
limits. One of their proposals suggested that part-time work should pay
twice the hourly wage of full-time work. Because women who worked
part time did so to spend the rest of their time with domestic responsibili-
ties, social feminists wanted to compel employers to compensate for this
dual role.30 Once again, social feminists accepted the double burden, but
suggested rearrangement of work-time and compensation which would al-
low women to fill the two roles without suffering economic loss, and with-
out being required to construct a male biography of their working life. 31
This proposal goes a long way toward explaining what social feminists
28. Id. at 104. As the province of a women's community, these social feminists battled for the
minimum wage in a style of separatism historians have located prior to suffrage. Though this kind of
separatism broke down during the New Deal, I find evidence of women's political culture, at least in
the early post-suffrage years. This separatism, very much a source of strength, was tempered by a
certain degree of male deference. For example, though Florence Kelley actually ran the National
Consumers' League, the President of the organization was always male. In this period the president
was Newton Baker, soon to be replaced by John Commons. Law also opened possibilities for integra-
tion with the political system, where women had finally gained formal access with suffrage, but it also
limited and shaped social feminist ideals. See Freedman, Separatism as Strategy: Female Institution
Building and American Feminism, 1870-1930, 5 FEMINIST STUDIES 512 (1979); Baker, The
Domesticization Of Politics: Women and American Political Society, 1780-1920, 89 AM. HIsT. REV.
620 (1984), for the significance of these two phases of American feminism and arguments that 1920
was the watershed. On Florence Kelley's background in a women's political culture, see Sklar, Hull
House in the 1890s: A Community of Women Reformers, 10 SIGNS 658 (1985) [hereinafter Sklar,
Hull House]; Sklar, Why Were Most Politically Active Women Opposed to the E.R.A. in the 1920s?,
in RIGHTS OF PASSAGE: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF THE E.R.A. 25 (J. Hoff-Wilson ed. 1986).
Sklar finds that Kelley and other women at Hull House cooperated with men.
29. Perhaps it is no coincidence that these were the women social feminists admired most and
with whom they most identified, since most social feminists during the period were single.
30. D.C. MINIMUM WAGE BOARD, A STUDY OF WAGES OF WOMEN EMPLOYED AS CLEANERS,
MAIDS, AND ELEVATOR OPERATORS IN OFFICE BUILDINGS, BANKS AND THEATRES AND AS CAR
CLEANERS IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (1920).
31. On the need of women to construct a "biography" similar to a man's to gain equal treatment,
see C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAw 32-45 (1987).
MacKinnon explains that "difference" always indicates a power relationship.
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meant by industrial equality, and why they saw this attention to women's
difference from men as a means to achieve equality. They accepted the
double burden as reality. What they were looking for was a way to make
a doubly burdened life more livable. Reduced hours of labor created time
for children, and higher wages produced money to support those children.
Social feminists believed it was possible to convince the state-through
legislation and litigation-to cooperate in this scheme, in the name of fem-
inism and the family. To them, this was "industrial equality" and justice.
They also saw it as realistic.
What they viewed as unrealistic, however, was changing family rela-
tions so that men would shoulder half the burden of domestic responsibil-
ity. They called that proposal a "utopian dream." Although it was an
appealing dream, they were thoroughly convinced that men were not go-
ing to change. It seemed easier to alter the terms of an industrial economy
than to transform conditions of personal relationships."2 Constant aware-
ness of the need for change on the domestic level, coupled with refusal to
try to alter these conditions presented something of a strain within social
feminists' "realism." Often what they perceived as realistic was any issue
that could be legislated and litigated. 3
One issue social feminists consistently wanted to confront was sex dis-
crimination. They chose a strategy that addressed differences in women's
working experiences, over and above equal treatment, in order to elevate
women to equal status. They hoped women's labor laws would lead to
better jobs, rather than restrict women, believing that "a labor law which
accomplishes these results has the psychological effect of increasing the
sense of power and independence of women in industry." 4 Social femi-
nists perceived labor laws not only as a remedy for past wrongs, but also
as a means of empowering women workers.
Industrial equality suggested to social feminists the significance of work
itself for working-class women. Work, it seemed, could bring women joy
and fulfillment. Middle-class women were impressed by the way women
32. See generally Brief for Appellants, Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (Nos.
795 & 796); PROCEEDINGS, supra note 12, at 66-77, 120-28 (speech of Mary Gilson, What Women
Workers Mean to Industry; speech of Merica Hoagland, Labor Legislation for Women).
33. In keeping with the ongoing theme of realistic feminism versus theoretical equality, posed by
the National Woman's Party with the Equal Rights Amendment, Barbara N. Grimes discussed "neg-
ative freedom" posed against "positive freedom." Grimes, Protective Legislation for Women and the
Twentieth Amendment, BULL. CAL. Civic LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, March 1924, at 1.
34. M. Thomas & M. Van Kleeck, Second Statement of the Committee Appointed to Present
Considerations Affecting An Equal Rights Amendment; J. AM. ASS'N U. WOMEN, Jan. 1925, at 19
(summary of Van Kleeck's viewpoint). As participation in the legal system had been an empowering
experience for middle-class women, social feminists were interested in a wide variety of legal solutions
to women's problems. As an attempt to achieve equality, they sponsored in this period over twenty
bills to correct women's unequal legal status in nearly every state. See NAT'L LEAGUE OF WOMEN
VOTERS, supra note 1. It follows they believed the effects of the laws could be just as empowering for
the women they were created to help, but legal action provided political access for the social feminists
only, and they took matters out of the hands of the working women for whom they legislated. Unions
would have given working women more of a voice and greater access to democracy.
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had "become an essential factor in a sphere formerly considered not to be
theirs." 8 Celebrating this role for women, social feminists combined a
"joy of work" viewpoint with the "essential nature" of women's work.
Where they had once advocated women's hours limitation by subordinat-
ing women's labor to the family, they now argued that women made a
vital contribution to family income and were often solely responsible for
the support of others. 6 The answer to women's double burden was not to
be found in "closing the doors of industry to women." Instead, women
deserved to be rewarded for their independence, responsibility and value;
they were entitled to "dignity" in their work. Proceeding on the assump-
tion that most, but not all, women married, and that not all married
women had children, they began to depict working women as more than
caretakers. Women, they insisted, were not to be characterized only as
mothers."
Veteran labor organizer Agnes Nestor scolded these middle-class
women, dissenting from the "joy of work" notion: "It's all right to talk
about the joy of work. I know the 'joy of work.' When I began working I
did not want to hear the whistle blow. But that was before I had worked
a long enough number of years to feel the strain ... that I did eventually
feel and under which I broke."3"
Middle-class and working-class women may have had differing atti-
tudes about work, but they were able to agree on the burden of the double
day. Those women who were called to the "double draft" of industrial
labor and household work were operating at a disadvantage. By compari-
son, wage-earning men were a "privileged class;" they had far fewer re-
sponsibilities at home than did their working wives. Women faced the
choice either of neglecting their families for the sake of their own indepen-
dence or of catering to family needs, while sapping their own "vitality." 9
To achieve citizenship on par with men, women needed legal measures to
alleviate their double burden. Rather than protect women in motherhood,
social feminists worried that women were "stunted" by their lack of civic
35. See PROCEEDINGS, supra note 12, at 24-34, 177-78 (speech of Mary Van Kleeck, What
Industry Means to Women Workers; Resolution, Women's Industrial Conference, January 13, 1923).
36. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 30, THE SHARE OF WAGE-EARNING
WOMEN IN FAMILY SUPPORT (1923).
37. See PROCEEDINGS, supra note 12, at 24-34, 66-77, 85-91 (speech of Mary Van Kleeck,
What Industry Means to Women; speech of Mary Gilson, What Women Workers Mean to Industry;
speech of Sophonisba Breckenridge, The Equal Wage).
38. Id. at 178-84 (speech of Agnes Nestor, of the National Glove Workers of America). Although
historians have criticized social feminists for refusing to recognize women may have worked for inde-
pendence, sociability and enjoyment, it is true that middle-class women in this movement often looked
upon industrial labor as "exciting." It was working-class sisters who called them on it. For criticism
that social feminists saw working-class women as "beasts of burden," see generally N. CoTr, supra
note 11, at 117-42; see also J. SEALANDER, As MINORITY BECOMES MAJORITY: FEDERAL REAC-
TION TO THE PHENOMENON OF WOMEN IN THE WORK FORCE, 1920-1963 (1983); W. WANDERSEE,
WOMEN'S WORE AND FAMILY VALUES, 1920-1940 (1981).
39. See NCL, SPECIAL LEGISLATION, supra note 17.
19891
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
involvement, and they urged facilitation of that participation, lest the pub-
lic be deprived of their viewpoint. As voters, women were "for the first
time . . . sharing in the government," and so the National Consumers'
League declared its new task for women: "We must see to it that indus-
trial life is compatible with citizenship in democracy." 4
Women were also different from men because they earned lower wages,
a problem compounded by their being classed into the least skilled and
most draining jobs. They earned "just enough to keep body and soul to-
gether," and this didn't leave much left for "social questions." Political
citizenship was contingent on "industrial citizenship," and thousands of
women did not exercise their rights "largely because of economic condi-
tions.""' Women's labor laws were an attempt to create a healthy work-
place, with high enough wages, so that working women could enjoy rights
more often exercised by men. In the wake of suffrage, this was separate
treatment to create equality and political integration.42
IV. 1920's WOMEN'S POLITICAL CULTURE: SEPARATISM AND
REPUBLICANISM
The minimum wage was not exclusively a social feminist initiative. Re-
formers such as John Commons and John Andrews had, since the turn-
of-the-century, put a minimum wage on the agenda of labor law reform.
They shared with social feminist Florence Kelley the goal of achieving
labor laws for all workers to limit the working day, to provide a living
wage, and to secure healthy, safe workplaces.
The prevailing judicial treatment of labor law, however, convinced re-
formers that they would have a better chance of validating labor laws in
court if these laws were exclusively for women.43 As an opening door,
reformers introduced labor legislation for women, hoping that once these
laws were entrenched, labor laws for men would be more easily secured.
Within this reform community, however, women's laws quickly became
40. Id.
41. Women's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Press Release (Jan. 20, 1926) (Box 234, in Papers of
National Woman's Party, at Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress).
42. For examples of separate treatment to gain equal participation, see Kelley, supra note 1; J.
HICKS, supra note 19. Far from relying exclusively on "expediency arguments" of the pre-suffrage
years, as suggested by Felice Gordon in AFTER WINNING: THE LEGACY OF THE NEW JERSEY SUF-
FRAGISTS, 1920-1947, at 19, 58-62, 103-04 (1986), these women were relying on "justice arguments"
as well. As believers in equality for women, they embraced republican ideology. And they blended
their republicanism with uses of difference and separateness in the expediency style. Their ideology
can be characterized as a melding of both styles of reasoning. See A. KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE
WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, 1890-1920 (1965), for a background on suffrage ideologies as "ex-
pediency" and "justice." See also N. CoTT, supra note 11, for an updated treatment of this problem.
43. In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the Supreme Court denied the validity of a
statute regulating the hours of male bakers, but it hinted that it might treat hours legislation for
women more favorably. Reformers followed with Muller. For apt discussions of this, see J. BAER,
supra note 8; S. LEHRER, ORIGINS OF PROTECTIVE LABOR LEGISLATION FOR WOMEN, 1905-1925
(1980).
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women's work, and it was the social feminists who took up the task of
education, legislation and publication on protective labor legislation for
women. As women oversaw initiatives on women's hours limitation, re-
striction of nightwork and women's minimum wages, reform-minded men
worked to gain "social insurance," such as workmen's compensation, a
reform initially geared only toward men." Reform work became seg-
mented by gender, and in the process women developed their own political
culture. This women's political culture was a source of strength to social
feminists, and it was a device to integrate themselves into the larger
(male) political community.4"
In their women's political culture, social feminists formed their own
consciousness of women's labor laws. Although the ultimate goal was la-
bor laws for all workers, social feminists who focused primarily on wo-
man- and child-centered issues found their own meaning in separate laws
for women. To them, the significance of women's labor laws went far
beyond opening the door for men-which was the legal-strategic reason
separate women's laws were introduced first. They became a vehicle for a
feminist goal: legal equality through difference.'
The struggle of early twentieth-century social feminists to reconcile
work and family led social feminists to a viewpoint in 1920 that they had
not anticipated in 1900. By the twenties, their ideology of womanhood
had shifted considerably. Although social feminists were beginning to see
men and women as largely the same, they also recognized important areas
where women's experiences diverged from men's. Social feminists sup-
ported minimum wage laws based on a vision of women as equally capa-
ble as men, but nonetheless different. They sought wage laws for women
as a way of raising women's earnings, and consequently their value in
society. Women were most importantly different because they earned
alarmingly less than men. But the legal ideology of separate labor laws
relied on differences that were presumed permanent; women's double bur-
den, perceived as unalterable, was a useful point to make in defending
women's need for "protection." Accounting for both sameness and differ-
ence encompassed social feminists' ideology of industrial equality, which
they promoted as a legal possibility for women's economic uplift.
Their ideology of industrial equality drew from two different strands in
law, each derived from previous experiences."7 Fusing the two, they be-
44. See generally R. LUBOVE, supra note 7, at 52-65.
45. Sklar, Hull House, supra note 28; Nelson, The Gender, Race, and Class Origins of Early
Welfare Policy and the Welfare State: A Comparison of Workmen's Compensation and Mothers' Aid
(forthcoming in WOMEN IN TWENTIETH CENTURY POLITICS (P. GURIN & L. TILLY eds.)).
46. For background on this reform community, see two studies of women's labor laws, J. BAER,
supra note 8; S. LEHRER, supra note 43. Neither author gives attention to how different these reform
issues were for social feminists who participated in the process.
47. Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917), the case that upheld regulation of men's hours of
labor, made clear that men needed a shorter work day to participate in community affairs, to be good
citizens. The standards of Bunting were hardly the standards of Muller, where women were in dan-
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gan to think that women could gain labor legislation which would prompt
equality. Those laws, however, had only been validated for protection of
community health and welfare, based on the rhetoric of sacred mother-
hood and preservation of the race. Rejecting that rhetoric, they began to
attempt a definition of equality, etching out an equality theory from the
traditions of republicanism and separatism. Republicanism, partly a con-
stitutional tradition and potentially a radical force, grew out of suffrage,
an experience shared by women who advocated women's labor laws. The
republican aspects of their theory stressed egalitarianism and participa-
tion, or political power.
Social feminists also drew on the heritage of separatism, a part of
women's political participation from the past. When women did not have
the right to vote, they participated in politics from outside formal power
sources to accomplish such diverse goals as prohibition and suffrage. From
these two vantage points, social feminists saw separate labor laws for
women as a way to achieve equal status for women through different
treatment. They did not demand that women act like men; they wanted
women to be equal to and different from men.
The twenties, the period when social feminists tried to merge the two
concepts of equality and separation, were between two well-known phases
of American feminism, which historians have called "separatism" and
"integration." Separatism was characterized by nonvoting women, who
were thought to be more pure than men because they did not participate
formally in politics. But through a separate women's political culture, so-
cial feminists formed bonds with one another and exerted pressure for
change from outside official power sources.4 In the period of integration,
the thirties, social feminists gave up their separate culture for formal as
well as informal places in the New Deal government.49
When social feminists tried to merge the theory of separatism (women's
differences from men) with the theory of integration (republicanism), they
attempted to bridge the distance between two political styles, the old and
the new, for American social feminism. Their merging of these two con-
cepts was far from perfect, and it generated a great deal of ambivalence. It
is significant, however, that they tried to work with a theory of equality
that did not assume sameness as a standard for equality. For them, equal-
ity and difference were not oppositional concepts; social feminists saw no
ger of damaging their reproductive organs and neglecting their children. Social feminists had been
involved in Bunting, and it is very possible that after suffrage they believed they could legitimately
argue for women's labor laws along the lines of Bunting. Unfortunately, their attorney, Felix Frank-
furter, did not quite make that attempt.
48. See Baker, supra note 28, for discussion of women's voluntary activities outside of formal
power structures as being more than outside, but actually "above" official power sources.
49. On this process, see generally Freedman, supra note 28, for a view that the period of separa-
tism was preferable; but see S. WARE, BEYOND SUFFRAGE: WOMEN IN THE NEw DEAL (1981), for a
more positive reading of women's political integration.
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need to justify their coexistence. Lawyers and judges, in contrast, did not
see this feminist theory very clearly.
Social feminists still claimed a right to state protection of women's labor
for reasons that set women apart from men-for gendered reasons-but
they also proudly drew on women's full citizenship and began to include
enjoyment of full participatory rights as a reason to protect women. Com-
bined with notions of women's independence, self-sufficiency and the ben-
efit of work was recognition that many working women were hindered in
these "rights" by the double burden, exploited labor and consequent low
wages. All these issues encouraged social feminists to think in terms of
industrial equality, and with suffrage behind them, they believed they had
all the more reason to think prospects for a women's minimum wage were
better than ever.
As a generation of social feminists historically between separatism and
integration, it made sense that the ideology of industrial equality inte-
grated sameness and difference. Somewhere between full participation and
a place "above politics," these social feminists tried to reconcile conflicting
strains from each world. Their ideas reflected their own social and politi-
cal reality. But they were stuck with old legal methods for their new
ideas, and it was a struggle to maintain a style of reasoning for minimum
wages that had been successful with hours restriction. One problem was
that social feminists simply no longer believed in the older characteriza-
tion of women. Although they still advocated distinct legal measures for
women, they did so to bring women into the former male sphere of power,
and to give women advantages formerly reserved for men. Social feminists
aimed to bring their new concepts to the Supreme Court for validation, as
they had done before, and they expected their lawyerly sympathizers to
comprehend this goal. But lawyers adhered to the prior vision of women
which had guided previous protective labor laws: a vision that set women
apart from men because they were different and, therefore, unequal.
V. LAWYERS AND WOMEN'S EQUALITY
The 1920's discourse on women's equality contained three alternatives.
Competing for dominance were the social feminist vision of industrial
equality, the National Woman's Party campaign for the Equal Rights
Amendment, and the view from the male legal community. The liberal
lawyers who supported separate women's labor laws were allied with, but
sharply distinct from, social feminists. Dividing the movement along gen-
der lines, these men had no commitment to industrial equality. To them,
separate treatment meant inequality-something they favored.
Whereas social feminists were developing a critique of equality through
identical legal treatment male lawyers tended to oppose women's equality
of any kind. Social feminists favored women's labor laws as means to
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equality, and they were troubled by posed contradictions between formal
legal equality (ERA) and separate treatment (women's labor laws). Con-
tradiction between these two methods was partly imposed by lawyers. To
them, women's equality was a liability, denying what was in their view
an exalted status for women in society.
Most lawyers in 1923 viewed the ERA as a threat to privileges women
enjoyed based on inequality. Equality would eliminate better treatment of
women, and therefore hurt them. One lawyer thought the "chief difficulty
with the amendment seems to be the word 'equality.' "5 Lawyers stressed
differences between men and women as a "well recognized fact" which
mandated "special and restrictive laws" for women.5 1 Social feminists
were not uncomfortable with the word "equality," which they themselves
used; they were only concerned with how equality was to be defined.
Rather than speaking of women's labor laws as restrictive, they had begun
to advocate them as a means to empower women, especially through
higher wages. But their legal advisors disagreed. For them, the purpose of
these laws had nothing to do with "civil and legal rights of women," even
though social feminists had defended the wage law as a matter of full
enjoyment of "rights." Women's labor laws, to lawyers, served only to
protect women from "hardships, wrongs and evils."' 52 Male lawyers
stressed physiological differences between the sexes, which social feminists
were then downplaying. And to lawyers, accounting for differences meant
precluding equality.
Women in the League of Women Voters and Consumers' League con-
sulted with several lawyers in their reform circles on the question of
equality. They wanted to know the extent to which women's labor laws
and formal equal rights were contradictory. Although social feminists had
begun to see women's labor laws as promoting industrial equality, their
lawyers were forthright in asserting that previous protective laws had
been based on inequality. Muller v. Oregon, declared one lawyer, would
never have been successful if it had not been premised on women's ine-
quality. By upholding women's employment statutes, the court "did create
legal inequalities in respect of sex. ' '1
4
50. Letter from Robert Szold to Florence Kelley (Jan. 4, 1922) (Reel 51, in National Consumers'
League Collection, at Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress).
51. Letter from James R. Garfield to Mrs. Gifford Pinchot (Feb. 6, 1922) (Series 2, Box 102, in
League of Women Voters Collection, at Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress).
52. Id.
53. Letter from William Draper Lewis to Mildred S. Gordon (Dec. 5, 1922) (Series 2, Box 102,
in League of Women Voters Collection, at Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress).
54. Letter from Francis Fisher Kane to Ethel Smith (Jan. 12, 1922) (Series 2, Box 102, in
League of Women Voters Collection, at Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress). Other liberal
lawyers made their opinions known to social feminists. See, e.g., Letter from Roscoe Pound to Alice
Paul (n.d.) (excerpt, Reel 16, in Margaret Dreier Robins Papers, in Papers of the National Women's
Trade Union League and Its Principal Leaders, at University of Florida, Gainesville, FL); Letter
from Roscoe Pound to Felix Frankfurter (Feb. 3, 1922) (Series 2, Box 102, in League of Women
Voters Collection, at Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress); Letter from Edwin Borchard to
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Felix Frankfurter, the Consumers' League lawyer, who would argue
Adkins before the Supreme Court, was one of the staunchest opponents to
women's equality, in part because he was such an advocate of women's
labor laws. To his legal mind, that meant favoring women's inequality.
Declaring that the law must account for diversity in women's "nature,"
Frankfurter insisted laws should treat females sometimes as "persons"
and other times as "women." Although social feminists often discussed
women's diversity, they never saw it as a matter of nature; they instead
viewed social roles and labor conditions as impediments to women's equal-
ity. Frankfurter's distinction between women and persons was a far cry
from social feminists' claims of "women first" as an approach to women's
predicament, but it also mirrored feminist ambivalence about sameness
and difference. 5
Protective laws relied on separate treatment of men and women, and
this both reflected earlier social ideals of womanhood and encouraged be-
havior that reinforced this ideal in the economic sphere. Lawyers who
wrote on equality, even those who supported women's labor laws, ex-
pressed the dominant legal view in these matters. Separate treatment, le-
gally, meant inequality. In part, hours restriction had been successful be-
cause American social feminism had been in accord with these legal
principles and broader social outlooks. Although social feminists did not
advocate women's inequality, they did stress women's separateness and
difference. In so doing, they were able to gain women's labor laws. After
suffrage, social feminism and the ideology of industrial equality were at
odds with legal ideology.
In the twenties, while social feminism was in transition, women contin-
ued to speak about the women's minimum wage as a matter of equality.
Social feminists-unlike their lawyers-did not see protection as "a sign
of weakness or inferiority," rather its achievement indicated "the power
and importance of women in industry."56 They were in favor of "positive
gains"'57 for women, which could be obtained, they theorized, not by
adopting sameness in law and subjecting women to a "male standard, ' '5 8
which would encourage inequality, but by stressing different treatment for
similar results.59
Ruth Dadaunian (Feb. 22, 1922) (Reel 51, in Papers of the National Consumers' League, at Manu-
scripts Division, Library of Congress).
55. See J. HICKS, supra note 19; F. Frankfurter, Lawyers' Opinions (c. 1922) (Reel 51, in Na-
tional Consumers' League Collection, at Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress).
56. Letter from Gertrude Besse King to Wenona Osborne Pinkham (Nov. 8, 1922) (Reel 53, in
National Consumers' League Collection, at Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress).
57. Declaration Adopted by the Conference of Trade Union Women at the Call of the National
Women's Trade Union League (Feb. 26, 1922) (Reel 51, in National Consumers' League Collection,
at Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress).
58. NAT'L LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, supra note 1.
59. Miss Wing Raps Equality Bill, Ohio Press, Apr. 22, 1924; NCL, WHY IT SHOULD NOT
PASS, supra note 1. "Identity" of treatment, they believed, was "restrictive," and they feared women
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There was a division between lawyers and social feminists. Although in
advocating women's minimum wage laws, social feminists can be seen as
attempting to feminize the law, lawyers remained resistant to that possi-
bility. Frankfurter probably captured this best in his discussion of Crystal
Eastman, a supporter of ERA "I am aware that Crystal Eastman once
upon a time knew something about law, but that was long ago and far
away. Now she disregards her former learning and writes as a 'femi-
nist.' "6 To Frankfurter, legal ideology and feminist politics were mutu-
ally exclusive, and his view was echoed by most male lawyers and judges:
thinking like a lawyer excluded thinking like a feminist. Those who fa-
vored industrial equality assumed law and social feminism could be
merged, and, in fact, made the merger the fundamental point of women's
minimum wage laws. Frankfurter enthusiastically supported women's
minimum wage laws, but the social feminist notion of bringing gender
distinction to the law to promote equality escaped him.61
Law had its human conduits in this story. Social feminists such as Flo-
rence Kelley and Molly Dewson worked on the women's minimum wage
test case through the National Consumers' League, a progressive organi-
zation which emphasized legal solutions to social problems. During the
twenties their legal counsel was the ambitious lawyer Felix Frankfurter,
whose tenure at the Consumers' League followed in the footsteps of his
mentor Louis Brandeis. The method of sociological jurisprudence, often
associated with Brandeis, was the calling card of the Consumers' League.
Frankfurter was significant to Dewson and Kelley because he was to ar-
gue their case on behalf of women workers' wages in the Supreme Court.
But he was more than that. He was the emissary of legal ideology, well-
trained and versed in dominant legal thinking. His knowledge comprised
an unknown deficit for the social feminists' cause; it embodied the very
limitation of the law for social feminism.
Lawyers represented, if nothing else, the received legal wisdom, and
they hinted at what was to come in Adkins, where the social feminist
being subjected to a male legal standard. If women were dominated by the "male norm" they would
not be able to gain equality. Male preferences, they were concerned, might be legally invoked for
women if there were not separate standards, and women would then have no choice in the matter.
This "negative freedom" they posed against "real freedom," and it provided a critique of law as male
defined as well as a gender sensitive alternative. See Grimes, supra note 33.
The League of Women Voters announced: "The League believes that equality of opportunity does
not and cannot mean identity of opportunity." Definition of Position of National Woman's Party and
National League of Women Voters on Special Legislation, supra note 20. The Consumers' League
asked in one Bulletin, "What are included in 'rights?' Does equal mean identical? What does it
mean?" BULL. CONSUMERS' LEAGUE E. PA. (March 1924).
60. Frankfurter, The Equal Rights Amendment, NEw REPUBLIC, Nov. 24, 1924, at 20.
61. For an insightful discussion of how patriarchal values shape litigation structure as well as
doctrine, see White, Unearthing Barriers to Women's Speech: Notes Toward a Feminist Sense of
Procedural Justice (forthcoming in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY
(M. FINEMAN ed.)). White advances the idea that feminists might be able to overcome patriarchal
doctrine and procedure through a gendered approach to law.
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claim to industrial equality was incomprehensible to the justices. Signifi-
cantly, this was true even though the Court was dominated by conserva-
tive judges who were politically distinct from the liberal lawyers in alli-
ance with Consumers' League leaders.
Contemporary liberal observers feared a conservative mood at the Court
in 1923, especially in light of recent anti-labor decisions and several con-
servative Harding appointments. "The economic complexion of the Court
will have to change materially before we can hope for greater liberality,"
one lawyer told the League of Women Voters. He suspected that anti-
labor sentiments, combined with the proposed ERA, which cast women's
labor laws as inegalitarian, were certain to bring an adverse decision in
Adkins.62 Yet he failed, as did all other observers, to see that suffrage was
equally threatening, in the eyes of the law, to women's labor laws. Al-
though social feminists feared the effect of the ERA on the women's mini-
mum wage, it was suffrage that had actually changed the legal status of
women and had encouraged social feminists to significantly alter their rea-
sons for defending the women's minimum wage. And it was suffrage, it-
self, that could be turned against these laws.
Social feminists were attempting to influence law, as they believed their
past advocacy of women's hours laws and suffrage had done. However,
legal ideology had also influenced social feminists. Their success in previ-
ous litigation had partly relied upon women being in a separate legal
class, as the Muller decision had noted.6" Other factors, too, had put pre-
vious women's labor laws in a favorable light. Putting motherhood first
among women's roles and stressing women's physical inferiority was not a
challenge or a threat to the judicial outlook on gender roles. Women's
differences from men suggested to the Supreme Court and to dominant
legal thinking that women were unequal. Now social feminists wanted to
rely on difference to gain special treatment that might, in their view, en-
courage legal equality. This was a different matter. Influenced by suffrage
and the equal citizenship it implied, they were drawing on a strain in
American law that probably bore little relationship to the police power,
which had justified previous protective labor legislation.
The police power was an important exception to "free contract" ideol-
ogy, which enabled the state to intervene in the bargain between employer
and employee in order to mandate certain conditions of labor concerning
the health, safety or morals of the community. Women's differences, both
physiological and social, became the basis of police power exceptions in
women's labor laws, and the community interests protected were often the
real or potential offspring of the working women, rather than the women
62. Letter from Francis Fisher Kane to Ethel Smith, supra note 54. For examples of anti-labor
decisions during the previous year, see Am. Steel Foundaries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257
U.S. 184 (1921); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
63. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
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themselves. In part, the courts were sympathetic to this argument because
disenfranchised women were seen as wards of the state, which made it
easier for the courts to justify legal interference in the "bargain" between
employer and female employee."
As the social feminist acceptance of female dependency gave way in the
1910's to a new vision of industrial equality in the 1920's, social feminists
found themselves arguing for women's minimum wages in a style no
longer compatible with the police power rule they had previously used to
their advantage. They now faced a new legal problem. How were they to
establish a link between the police power and yet remain true to their
ideology of industrial equality? The brief created by Molly Dewson was
an attempt to mediate this political problem.
VI. SOCIAL FEMINISM AND THE Adkins BRIEF
By 1923 when the women's minimum wage test case, Adkins v. Chil-
dren's Hospital, reached the Supreme Court, the character of the wage
issue was clearly separated from other women's labor laws. Social femi-
nists, in their new vision of economic rights and industrial equality, were
challenging the established boundaries of state intervention in the econ-
omy. Their feminism had led them to a direct departure from the eco-
nomic status quo.
Hours legislation and health and safety measures involved intervention
in the economy, but the cost to employers could always have been made
up in reduced wages. A state-imposed floor on wages signaled to conserva-
tive employers, and to a majority of the Supreme Court, a "redistributive"
culmination to the era of "progressive" reform. This redistributive capac-
ity was, of course, very moderate, but on the heels of the Red Scare it
raised the specter of socialism. Enemies of minimum wage laws for
women argued that these laws involved "changing the rules" of economic
principles, and that they were illegitimate because they were concerned
only with money. If low wages were dangerous, they offered, then so was
capitalism itself. The Constitution, they feared, was being used to tamper
with capitalism.6"
64. But these laws also rested on a certain ideology of womanhood, which was compatible with
both the uses of the police power and women's inequality. My interpretation of the police power in
women's labor laws is influenced by J. BAER, supra note 8.
65. See generally Appellants' Reply Brief at 4-13, Children's Hosp. v. Adkins, 284 F. 613 (D.C.
Cir. 1922) (No. 3438), aff d, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). Many reformers were trying to make the same
point. Labor law leaders such as John Commons and John Andrews of the American Association for
Labor Legislation wanted, in fact, to save capitalism from self-destruction by protecting workers'
health and by "humanizing" industry enough to prevent working-class revolution by establishing in-
dustrial peace. See generally Ross, Socialism and American Liberalism: Academic Social Thought in
the 1880's, 11 PERSP. AM. HIST. 5 (1977-78). Social feminists were involved in "changing the rules"
of the economy for women, but over and above this they were interested in new models for women's
equality, other than ERA, which led them to see these laws as economic justice for working-class
women, and they therefore had reasons different from their male counterparts for supporting this
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Both sides brought their competing views of economic policy to the Su-
preme Court. While economic policy issues dominated the case, and the
social class issues raised by it are very significant, judicial comment on
women's legal status is equally important to understanding Adkins.
The brief presented by the National Consumers' League in Adkins rep-
resented the culmination of a generation's work and evolving ideas on
women in society. Meticulously prepared by Molly Dewson, it drew on
many social feminist claims to industrial equality, selecting pertinent data
from amassed investigations of women's organizations. In preparing the
brief for the Consumers' League, Dewson did most of the sociological and
economic work for attorney Frankfurter, who worked on the legal argu-
ments and appeared in court. 6
Dewson told the Court that work was not degrading to women. Where
previously social feminists had argued to preserve women's health from
the horrors of industrial labor, now they argued that work itself was far
less damaging to a woman than low wages. No longer interested in ac-
cepting female dependency or curtailing opportunities, social feminists
now favored expanded rights for women in the form of a right to decent
wages. But the brief, and this argument, were limited by the need to prove
a police power exception to free contract.
To convince the Court that a police power exception was compatible
with women's minimum wage laws, Dewson had to demonstrate women
were separate from men in order to distinguish them as a "class" needing
protection. After suffrage, this was more difficult to do, because women
had the same political rights as men. Although potential starvation repre-
sented an important threat to a woman's health, social feminists saw the
need for minimum wages as more than a safeguard to health. Viewing the
state less as a caretaker and more as an agent of freedom for women,
social feminists wanted to transform dependency into an alternative form
of equality. Social feminists wanted women's minimum wage laws not
primarily to protect women's health, but as an answer to working
women's economic disadvantages.6 7
method. These economic issues, and the two-sided motivation for them, had a great deal to do with
why the police power might not have applied to wage laws in 1923. See generally WOMEN'S BUREAU,
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 17, WOMEN'S WAGES IN KANSAS (1921); WOMEN'S BUREAU,
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 23, THE FAMILY STATUS OF BREADWINNING WOMEN (1922);
Brief for Appellants, Adkins v. Children's Hosp., supra note 32, at 880-82, 902-06.
Some historians have argued that reformers were equally afraid of socialism, that labor laws were
their method of preventing it, and that protective labor laws succeeded only so long as they were
necessary to preserve capitalism. See S. LEHRER, supra note 43. That analysis does not take into
account the significance of these cases in terms of gender, nor does it credit social feminists with
pushing beyond the needs of capitalism, and therefore, failing to play into employers' hands by
stressing industrial efficiency as a reason to welcome these laws. Feminism and capitalism were at
odds.
66. S. WARE, PARTNER AND 1: MOLLY DEWSON, FEMINISM, AND NEW DEAL POLITICS 97-102
(1987), details the relationship between Dewson and Frankfurter.
67. On the problem of claiming rights when there are none, see Hartog, The Constitution of
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In their brief, social feminists celebrated the value of women's work. As
economic and social justice, "underpayment of large groups of women"
was "contrary to all standards, economic as well as social." The minimum
wage offered the "first step toward the elevation of women in industry to
a plane where due recognition is given the value of their work."6 Dewson
selected material that stressed women as breadwinners, with family mem-
bers dependent on their support. In an effort to overcome the long stand-
ing myth that women worked only for "pin money," she relied on reports
that stressed women's labor as crucial to family support.6"
If husbands were absent or unemployed, Dewson argued, women
worked to support children. If a man was disabled or had deserted his
wife, she was solely responsible for her family. Young single women often
worked to support parents, a responsibility young men often escaped. Di-
vorced or widowed women supported themselves and their children as
well; they had no other source of income, and their own wages had to
suffice. In sum, women made an important economic contribution to fam-
ily life, whether they were single or married, and social feminists vigor-
ously pointed to this in their brief. A community larger than women
themselves needed a woman's wages. Older assumptions that only men
shouldered such economic responsibility did not apply.7
The double burden separated women from men, the social feminists'
brief declared, and part of the difficulty was childcare. To afford such
care for their children, many women needed increased wages. Working
women were shouldering the "double social significance," but the solution
was not depending on someone else. They simply needed more money to
afford their many dependents, and they needed fewer hours of labor to
allow more time for caregiving. Social feminists were attempting to alter
the dominant culture's view of the American family. They did not chal-
lenge the family arrangement; instead they emphasized women's contribu-
tion to that family as something socially worthy and deserving of decent
wages.7
1
To argue that women's wages were based on actual responsibility to
others, however, did not demonstrate a direct relationship between
Aspiration and the "Rights that Belong to Us All," 74 J. AM. HIST. 1013 (1987).
68. Brief for Appellants, Adkins v. Children's Hosp., supra note 32, at 767.
69. Id. at 688-89, 877-78. Mary Anderson said the biggest job of the Women's Bureau was to
overcome this myth, and it was mostly what its staff worked at. M. ANDERSON & M. WINSLOW,
supra note 26, at 139-41. The breakthrough report-The Role of Women in Family Breadwin-
ning-was applauded by The Nation as finally having "exploded" that myth. 117 THE NATION 129
(1923). Winifred Wandersee argues that during the twenties women worked to provide "extras" for
their families, as both men and women were replacing the "value of work" with working for commod-
ities. Rising expectations for families sent women to work, Wandersee points out, and although many
women still worked out of need, in many instances the definition of need was changing. W. WANDER-
SEE, supra note 38, at 71-73.
70. Brief for Appellants, supra note 32, at 762, 896-900.
71. Id.
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women's wages and their health and welfare, a connection which was nec-
essary to prove the need for a police power exception to free contract. To
provide such a link, Dewson couched wages in terms of a cycle of " 'poor
wages,' 'poor health,' 'poor wages' " which was a "descending spiral into
the regions of destitution .... Individual suffering," and the larger general
"social loss" from low wages, which would bring "community decline,"
was "degrading to workers themselves." 2 Degradation was widespread,
but it oppressed men as well as women. Dewson and Frankfurter needed
to distinguish women from men to make an effective case for the women's
minimum wage. Portraying women as strong, responsible workers and ad-
mitting that work itself was less harmful to them than low wages sug-
gested a similarity between men and women. The right to a decent wage
did not appear particularly gender bound."
As industrial equality, the women's minimum wage was, to social femi-
nists, a question of increased economic equality. Social feminists wanted
wage laws for women so they would earn more money. There was a link
between starvation and public health, but it was not gender specific. What
was gender specific was women's devalued economic status. The brief for
the minimum wage stressed poverty, which implicated the police power
more than did other principles of industrial equality. But because it was
also closer to an argument for universal wage laws for men as well as
women, it interfered with the free contract ideology dominant in the twen-
ties and the tandem philosophy of laissez-faire.
Thus, the major principle that women needed a legal floor on their
wages because they earned less than men, and that economic disadvantage
needed correction so that women could enjoy rights to equality and citi-
zenship, was lost in the Adkins brief. Although the most important contri-
bution of industrial equality was the merging of equality and difference, it
had no real place within the police power. Furthermore, given Consum-
ers' League legal counsel Felix Frankfurter's views on women's equality,
it is not surprising that this aspect of industrial equality disappeared from
the case. Largely defending a reversal of inequality, social feminists faced
a police power rule that was not intended to promote equality, but to
preserve public welfare. If women were entitled to such welfare because
they supported others and were valuable to their communities, then men
72. Id. at 1023-24. Dewson and Frankfurter relied on the work of economists concerned with
labor and wages, but not particularly with women. For examples of economists upon whom Frank-
furter relied, see E.R.A. SELIGMAN, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1921); R. ELY, OUTLINES OF ECO-
NOMICS (1920).
73. In over one thousand pages of defense for the women's minimum wage, only 17 pages were
devoted to any material that represented the effect of low wages on babies and therefore motherhood.
This material, borrowed from the Children's Bureau, stressed the relationship between low wages and
infant mortality, but it also came from an agency that advocated raising men's wages so women did
not have to work. This was something of a departure from the way other social feminists-though in
the same camp-were headed with industrial equality. Brief for Appellants, Adkins v. Children's
Hosp., supra note 32, at 1053-70.
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would also be entitled. From the Court's perspective, this extension made
the women's minimum wage all the more threatening. Most significant
for social feminism, however, was the process by which legal rules-in
this case the police power-forced out more radical ideas so they would
have no voice in the courtroom.7
VII. THE Adkins DECISION
Justice Sutherland, one of Harding's recent conservative appointees,
spoke for the Supreme Court's majority. He was quick to point out the
difference between wages and other labor laws. To him, regulated wages
meant a different kind of state involvement with the economy. But the
Adkins case also represented a new view of women, and this was not lost
on Sutherland. Politically distant from the liberal lawyers consulted by the
Consumers' League, the very conservative Sutherland offered a new twist
on the legal dilemma of equality and difference. Comparing this case to
the hours test case, Muller, Sutherland noted that hours legislation had
been upheld based on differences between men and women.76 And he was
right. Looking at the world around him, he observed, however, the "an-
cient inequality of the sexes has continued with diminishing intensity. '"76
Why, since suffrage, inequality had almost reached the "vanishing
point!"' 77 The result of this newly won equality for women, he reasoned,
was that women had to be free to negotiate their own wages.78
Sutherland's denial of inequality, however, did not extend to overruling
Muller. The result was curtailed hours without the benefit of increased
wages. Sutherland saw no irony in declaring women free to work for any
wage offered, but too inferior and dependent to choose hours of labor. The
combination of low wages and restricted hours was worse for the woman
who worked than no laws at all."e
Enlisting the theoretical equality of women to defeat the women's mini-
mum wage, Sutherland found an effective means of turning social femi-
nism against women. Sutherland's view of equality was that it meant
sameness and identical treatment. Inequality had brought social feminists
74. On women's voices and legal structures in a more contemporary context, see White, supra
note 61.
75. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 552-53 (1923).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. Sutherland relied on Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), in turning to free con-
tract, even though many legal thinkers believed the case was no longer good law, and saw Suther-
land's use of it as a return to nineteenth century social Darwinism. Interestingly, he glossed over
Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1911), which would have provided a connection between labor laws
and men, as well as voting citizens. But Frankfurter did not make much use of Bunting either.
79. See R.J. LUSTIG, CORPORATE LIBERALISM: THE ORIGINS OF MODERN AMERICAN POLITI-
CAL THEORY, 1890-1920 (1982), on the power of the state to limit reform in capital's interests. Hours
limitation arguably could have been in capital's interests because less worker fatigue may have meant
increased worker production. Achieving that reform without increasing wages, however, constituted a
limitation on reform in the interests of a class of employers.
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to recognize difference, but to Sutherland, equality and difference could
never be reconciled. And by unevenly upholding hours regulation while
striking down a floor on wages, he denied the possibility of self-sufficient
womanhood, increasing chances of female poverty and dependency.
Oliver Wendell Holmes dissented. He saw no difference between wages
and hours; if one could be regulated, he reasoned, why not regulate the
other? He regarded his own opinion as "plain common sense," and in-
tended it to "dethrone Liberty of Contract from the ascendancy in the
Liberty business."8 Nevertheless, Holmes could not resist commenting on
women's equality. He, unlike Sutherland, was certain suffrage did not
create women's equality. "It will take more than the Nineteenth Amend-
ment to convince me there are no differences between men and women, or
that legislation cannot take those differences into account." '81 Despite the
fact that the politically liberal Holmes was more of a friend to women's
labor laws than Sutherland, he too assumed it was inequality that man-
dated attention to difference. Equality, to his mind, was sameness. Much
like Frankfurter, he used women's inequality to defend minimum wages
for women. 8
Judicial opinions drew on economic policy, free contract ideology, and
the role of the state in minimum wage laws. All the justices seemed to be
aware of the probability that the wage law would extend to men.8" The
embodiment of twenties conservatism in Harding's Court was hostile to
this path of policy development. The established economic-legal order of
the twenties was clear on the issue of wages: tampering with them was
inappropriate. Wage legislation appeared to jeopardize capitalism itself;
conservatives refused to compromise free contract ideology for a policy
they misconstrued as "bolshevism." Employers accepted hours regulation
because they were able to rationalize hours limitation as part of industrial
efficiency and, therefore, in their long-term profit interests. Wage legisla-
tion was perceived differently, however, because wages were directly
linked to profits in the employer's mind. A state-imposed floor on
women's wages looked like a profit cut, or at least interference with em-
ployer control. Profits were more sacred than motherhood."
Economic policy, however dominant, was not the only significant aspect
of Adkins. All the Justices and lawyers involved somehow grappled with
women's equality and difference. Certainly, Sutherland used women's
80. 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 495 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
81. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 570 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
82. Id.
83. Sutherland spent a good deal of time discussing men's hours laws, which only would have
been necessary to block wages for men, id. at 548-52 (majority opinion); and although Taft insisted
he was avoiding an opinion on men's laws, this was nevertheless on his mind. Id. at 566 (Taft, J.,
dissenting).
84. It would take a great deal of political pressure to get this Court finally to yield to a minimum
wage for women in 1937. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). That pressure was
not present in 1923.
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equality to rationalize his opposition to labor laws, but Holmes used
women's inequality to defend the minimum wage. A contradiction had
developed between equality and labor reform for women. Were women
entitled to these reforms because they were entitled to equality, as social
feminists argued, or to inequality, as Holmes argued? Did constitutional
equality mean "identity of treatment," as social feminists had feared, and
as Sutherland articulated? Social feminists had been trying to suggest that
women's equality could be defined legally in women's difference, without
loss and without contradiction. The contradiction imposed by legal ideol-
ogy distorted feminist theory.
VIII. CONCLUSION: SOCIAL FEMINISM AND LEGAL DISCOURSE
In the period between 1900 and 1923 the status of women had changed
considerably. Observers had come to understand that women were mar-
rying at a later age and were working to support themselves. Married
women worked to support children, often but not always with the help of
husbands. Young women at home often worked to support their parents.
And women had moved into the public sphere in unprecedented numbers;
they seemed to be there to stay. Social feminists had moved into leadership
ranks of their national and local organizations, as well as into some gov-
ernment posts. An organized women's movement had won the Nineteenth
Amendment.
Social feminism had changed too. Those who supported women's labor
laws viewed women as independent and important, a significant change
from the older view of women as weak and dependent. The earlier
women's labor law case, Muller, had presented just that view. But the
woman of Adkins was clearly not the woman of Muller.85
Industrial equality was an idea that tried to merge women's equality
with women's different experience to account for women's disadvantages
so as to alleviate them. It was a practical bridge between the law's rigid
definition of equality-as-sameness and social feminists' idea of equality-
through-difference. It also served as an ideological bridge between the sep-
arate spheres of men and women and women's political integration, and
therefore, reflected social feminists' own social reality in the 1920's.
Social feminists believed these were all reasons to expect the Supreme
Court to uphold women's minimum wage laws. But the Court turned
these gains against women. Denying the validity of women's minimum
wage laws, the Court used equality rhetoric, and especially suffrage,
against feminism, and hid behind a mask of equality for women, while
defeating what most of the Justices saw as a bid for the "redistributive"
85. Social feminists reiterated their proud accomplishments at their conferences, in their pam-
phlets and in their correspondence. Nonetheless, none of them ever explicitly noticed changes since
Muller, nor did they actively repudiate earlier arguments.
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state. Suffrage, and the equal citizenship it implied, had empowered social
feminists and had provided the groundwork for the idea of "industrial
equality." But as Florence Kelley observed, Sutherland essentially argued
that since suffrage, women had won the equal right to starve.8 Ironically,
social feminists had thought introduction of the ERA might create this
problem; nobody dreamed suffrage alone had this legal capacity.
While victories in the suffrage movement and in women's labor law
cases had encouraged women to act and had instilled in them a deep faith
in legal process as an agent of social change, law also revealed the capac-
ity to hold back the social feminist agenda by turning equality rhetoric
against women. This was especially true when social feminist demands
moved into the sphere of direct economic consideration. Even though so-
cial feminists advocated the women's minimum wage in defense of indus-
trial equality, their lawyers and the judges they encountered in Adkins
never quite comprehended this concept. To them, separate laws for
women were a matter of inequality. The only legal friends these social
feminists found were those who defended women's labor laws because
they favored women's inequality.
During the Adkins years, social feminists championed the women's
minimum wage as a feminist cause. And women's labor laws were sym-
bolic of social feminists' own women's political culture. In 1923 these so-
cial feminists were ambivalent about entering the male spheres of power,
and the industrial equality theory they used to defend minimum wage
laws for women reflected that ambivalence. When labor laws for all work-
ers were validated by the Court in 1941, male reformers declared that
victory would not have been possible without all the hard work of women
in previous years."7 Women workers and social feminists were a "wedge"
that had opened the way for larger reform. Although women rejoiced at
this victory, by then they had given up their women's political culture,
and women's labor laws had ceased to have any meaning for feminism.
When the notion of industrial equality failed in Adkins, social feminists
became afraid and demoralized. They believed in legal victory, had grown
dependent on it to legitimate themselves, and they began to want a place
inside the power structure, rather than in a separate women's culture.
They returned to old ideas that worked. The focus of their legal argu-
ments post-Adkins, especially in the thirties, drew upon sacred mother-
hood, preservation of the race, and women as reproducers who needed
protection. They had sacrificed a much more promising-and potentially
radical-ideology at the altar of legal acceptability.
86. Speech of Florence Kelley (1925) (Reel 100, in National Consumers' League Collection, at
Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress).
87. Address of Hon. Robert F. Wagner, Women in Industry, at the Public Affairs Dinner of the
Institute of Women's Professional Relations (Mar. 28, 1935) (Reel 31, in National Consumers'
League Collection, at Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress).
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Social feminists were limited by the need to put their ideal of industrial
equality into legal discourse. In transposing social feminist language into
legal rhetoric, Molly Dewson and Florence Kelley faced the legal system's
incapacity for recognizing gender differences. The standard for per-
sonhood in the law, social feminists were aware, was a male standard. To
gain equality in such a system, it was necessary to be the same as that
male model of personhood. Social feminists saw themselves as confronting
the male standard in law by emphasizing women's differences. They tried
to win equality in difference, but they were up against the legal contradic-
tions between equality and difference. The notion of equality and differ-
ence as binary opposites emerged out of the legal test of the women's min-
imum wage, but it was imposed by legal ideology on social feminist ideals.
